Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Review of Competition Law and Policy in the Czech Republic Abstract: The Czech Republic competition law is based on familiar European substantive concepts. Features that were appropriate for a transition setting are being revised in anticipation of EU accession. The enforcement body was at one time a separate Ministry; now, the Czech Office for the Protection of Economic Competition is an independent agency. Provisions for exemption are well controlled, and the processes for applying it are working well; however, stronger enforcement powers may be needed to deal with secret cartels. The major challenge of improving competitiveness by completing the reform of the inherited industrial structure requires solving problems of corporate governance and financing. The role of competition policy in that task will be modest. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 7-58 Volume: 4 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K6Q6G Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Portfolio Effects in Conglomerate Mergers Abstract: In the context of conglomerate merger review, portfolio effects seem to refer to the pro- and anti-competitive effects possibly arising when: the parties enjoy market power but not necessarily dominance; and the products joined are complementary or have analogous properties. When complementary products are merged, there is a potential for considerable synergies that could benefit buyers. There is also an increased potential for forced tying, pure bundling, or analogous practices (e.g. full line forcing) that could restrict buyer choice but also lower prices. Under certain strict conditions, consumers could gain in the short run but suffer long term harm from such practices if they eventually result in a sufficient reduction of competitors and capacity in a market. The hypothetical nature of such harm has led some to conclude that instead of prohibiting mergers having potentially harmful portfolio effects, competition agencies should instead take a wait and see attitude. That would involve using abuse of dominance or monopolisation prohibitions to control negative effects should they actually materialise. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 59-151 Volume: 4 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K6Q5C Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Darryl Biggar Title: Reform of the Railway Sector in Russia Abstract: The rail industry in Russia is one of the largest in the world. Russia’s vast distances, relatively under-developed road infrastructure, and high reliance on bulk commodities imply that the rail industry has a unique and key role in the transportation infrastructure of Russia. At present the industry is organised as a fully-integrated entity, operated by the Ministry of Railways. At a seminar in Moscow in December 2000, OECD experts and Russian officials discussed how this industry could be restructured to promote competition, enhance efficiency and to ensure that this industry best meets the needs of the growing Russian economy. The following summary sets out the key ideas and conclusions to emerge from that seminar. Three main topics are discussed: policies to establish a sound commercial environment for railway operators, structural options for competition and managing the transition to a competitive structure. A key issue is whether it would be possible to enhance competition by dividing the Russian rail industry into a number of verticaly-integrated railways, competing for the provision of rail services along the key rail transport corridors. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 153-164 Volume: 4 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K6Q40 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sally van Siclen Title: Review of Sectoral Reforms in Ireland Abstract: Sectoral reforms in Ireland have been an important part of the move toward market-based growth but as yet progress has varied among the sectors. Work by the OECD and by other organisations indicates that a range of key regulatory and competition issues remain in many sectors. In this report, we examine selected issues in electricity, gas and professional services, using legal services and pharmacies as case studies. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 7-65 Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3G5B Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Promoting Competition in the Natural Gas Industry Abstract: Natural gas is a key source of energy for OECD countries, both in its own right and as an input into the production of electricity. Regulatory reform in this sector shares both important similarities and important differences with regulatory reform in other network industries. Like other network industries, regulatory reform in natural gas involves promoting competition in the competitive segments of the industry (particularly competition between gas producers), the development of a robust regime for access to the remaining essential facilities, and structural separation between the competitive and non-competitive segments of the industry. OECD countries have pursued each of these steps, licensing independent producers, pricing access to pipeline infrastructure and separating gas production from transportation (although long-term take-or-pay contracts make this last reform more difficult). Unlike other network industries, however, the structure of the industry varies widely from country to country according to the number of domestic gas producers, the geographic location of pipelines and the uses to which natural gas is put. Countries which rely primarily on imported gas have less to gain from domestic reform and much to gain from reform in producing countries. As OECD gas sources diminish and reliance on imports increases, regulatory reform in natural gas will increasingly become an issue for international trade. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 67-145 Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3G0Q Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Darryl Biggar Title: Reform of Gas Sector in Russia Abstract: There are few, if any, industries more important to the Russian economy than the natural gas industry. Russia is a major gas exporter and has substantial natural gas reserves. This industry is dominated by a single vertically-integrated firm, RAO Gazprom. The industry has faced several problems, including low domestic prices, widespread non-payment (and barter and offset schemes) and a virtually complete lack of competition. At a seminar in Moscow in September 2001, OECD experts and Russian officials discussed what can be learned from the experience of reform in OECD natural gas industries. The topics covered include enhancing the transparency of Gazprom, the need for rebalancing of prices, the "right" price for gas relative to other fuels, the financing of new investment, the structure and powers of regulatory institutions and the promotion of competition in natural gas production. A key issue for the Russian economy is whether to structurally separate Gazprom. Separation of natural gas production and transportation has the potential to enhance competition between gas producers, and stimulate development of gas fields, without necessarily foregoing the market power that Russia enjoys in international gas markets. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 147-163 Volume: 4 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3FWH Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and Regulation Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry Abstract: The pharmaceutical sector is a dynamic, research-intensive industry that is fundamentally influenced by a web of regulations designed to a) promote research and innovation in the design and production of drugs, b) protect consumers from potentially harmful effects of drugs, and c) to control public and private expenditure on drugs. These objectives are sometimes in conflict and may require a balancing of the interests of  producers and consumers. Since most consumers have some form of health insurance, their incentives to control their purchasers of pharmaceuticals or to purchase from the most efficient pharmacist are limited. Health insurers seek to control pharmaceutial expenditure through various policies such as co-payments, lists of approved drugs and maximum reimbursement levels for different drugs. If reimbursement levels for pharmacists are set at a national or regional level, incentives for entry by new pharmacists are excessive in certain locations, typically leading to restrictions on the establishment of new pharmacies. Wellthought out reform of this industry has the potential to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures while maintaining the quality of the drugs consumed. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 102-222 Volume: 4 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3FJF Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Darryl Biggar Title: The Telecommunications Sector in Russia Abstract: In some ways, the Russian telecommunications industry is a paradox. Parts of the industry are highly competitive – the number of operators in this market is in the thousands – but the existing regulatory regime is weak, particularly in ensuring access to essential facilities, and the longdistance market is dominated by the company Rostelecom. In spring 2001, experts from OECD countries met with senior Russian officials to discuss their experiences with regulatory reform in telecommunications. The issues discussed include tariff reform, promoting universal service and ensuring access to non-competitive services. Traditionally, in Russia, prices for local fixed telephone service have been held very low, leading to a shortage of supply and significant cross-subsidies from long-distance services. The cross-subsidies from long-distance services are being eroded by new entry, leaving local operators unable to expand the network to meet demand. As in other Russian industries, tariff rebalancing is essential, while putting in place programmes to ensure access to telecommunications services in remoter areas. Competition could be deepened and broadened through a stronger and more effective system of access to the remaining non-competitive services such as local loops. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 223-230 Volume: 4 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3F24 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Parker Title: Review of Sectoral Reforms in the Czech Republic: Energy and Transportation Sectors Abstract: Since its creation in 1993, the Czech Republic has experienced a period of broad and deep changes to the legal structure and institutional frameworks that were necessary to ensure transition to a market economy. This chapter focuses on energy (gas and electricity) and transportation (road and rail freight) sectors, which are important in final consumption expenditure, and as inputs to other sectors, impact on overall economic competitiveness. Substantial progresses have been made over the past decade, the regulatory environment has been liberalised and some competition emerged. Reform, however, remains incomplete with the state still significantly involved in these sectors. Also, improvements are needed in the regulatory framework to build market confidence by improving clarity and transparency in the regulatory process. It is expected that prospects for Czech accession to the EU will encourage the authorities to establish such a framework in accordance with the relevant EU directives. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2002 Pages: 7-100 Volume: 4 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K3FNQ Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Capacity Building for Effective Competition Policy in Developing and Transitioning Economies Abstract: This note begins by briefly addressing why competition policy is important for developing and transitioning economies. It then discusses some of the critical components of building a competition culture. Ideally, this process should begin by conducting a "needs assessment" in a number of areas. This assessment likely will lead to the identification of a list of steps that should be prioritised and undertaken. The priorities often can be grouped into three broad areas, namely, helping key constituencies to "buy in" to a competition culture, minimizing the extent to which a broad range of institutional mechanisms distort competition, and building an effective competition law enforcement regime to address private anticompetitive conduct. The note then summarizes the valuable perspectives of countries that have been providers or recipients of capacity building and technical assistance. It is based upon the responses to a questionnaire circulated in 2001 to delegates of the OECD’s Competition Committee and non-members who had been invited to participate in the second Global Forum on Competition, held in February 2002. This discussion is followed by a brief discussion of the potentially helpful roles that cooperation and peer review can play in the process of building the institutional capacity of a domestic enforcement authority. After briefly discussing the Doha Declaration, the note summarises the OECD’s capacity building activities in the competition field. Finally, in the conclusion, some suggestions are offered regarding a multi-faceted strategy for future capacity building and technical assistance activities. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 7-23 Volume: 4 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K26BS Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Product Market Competition and Economic Performance Abstract: Increased competition in product markets, as well as being good for consumers, can also boost productivity and employment, according to the study Product Market Competition and Economic Performance by the OECD. Competition improves productivity through a more efficient use of resources. At the same time it can encourage innovation and the rapid spread of new technology. Reforms to make product markets more dynamic will also boost real wages as prices are lowered through increased competition. The study argues that reforms undertaken between the late 1970s to the late 1990s, such as the liberalisation of telecommunications industries, increased employment rates in OECD countries by an average of 1.5 percentage points, reaching 2.5 percentage points in economies where pro-competition policies were pursued most vigorously. This study forms a chapter in the OECD Economic Outlook No. 72 published in December 2002. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 25-34 Volume: 4 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K268X Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition Issues in Road Transport Abstract: The road transport sector, an essential mode of transport in OECD economies, is conventionally divided into two, largely unrelated, parts – the road freight industry and the road passenger industry. The sectors under discussion – trucking, buses, and taxis – have quite different characteristics and scope for competition, which reflect inter alia differences in the timeliness and economies of scale and scope in operations. Trucking can sustain high level of competition and to some extent buses as well while there is some debate as to how and what form of competition can be introduced in taxis. As in the air transport industry, international trucking is governed by restrictive bilateral treaties. Most countries have liberalised their domestic trucking sector, removing controls on entry and prices. In the bus industry, long-distance bus services are liberalised in some countries while intra-city or local buses are very rarely liberalised. The taxi industry appears at first sight to be competitive with many buyers and many sellers. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 35-133 Volume: 4 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K267K Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sally van Siclen Title: The Electricity Sector in Russia Abstract: The electricity sector plays a vital role in the economy of Russia and the well being of its citizens. Already partly privatised, reform of the structure and regulation of the sector has been on and off the political agenda for years. As part of the OECD’s long-term active support for reform efforts in the Russian Federation, a meeting was held in Moscow in May 2001 among experts from OECD member countries and Russian officials to discuss what could be learned from the experiences of reform in electricity sectors in OECD countries. Key recommendations addressed restructuring – ensuring sufficient deconcentration in generation and independent, non-discriminatory control of grid access by separate ownership of generation and transmission – transmission pricing, universal service, institutional arrangements – empowering an independent regulator with transparent objectives, powers, processes and decisions – and transitional arrangements. Russia is unique, but many of the policy considerations in Russia will also be important in many other countries. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 135-149 Volume: 4 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K266H Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency Abstract: This article comprises two notes by the Secretariat, one on the Objectives of Competition Law and Policy and the other one on the Optimal Design of a Competition Agency. Both notes were prepared to provide a framework for discussion at the meeting of the Global Forum on Competition (GFC) held on 10-11 February 2003. It was decided to link these topics together in the GFC's agenda after it was recognised that the objectives of competition law and policy can have an important bearing on the optimal design of a competition institution. However, it was agreed that the treatment of objectives should be oriented primarily towards a discussion of how they relate, or may relate, to the design of competition enforcement institutions within the broader government. Accordingly, the note on objectives does not fully explore the pros and cons of specific objectives that may be included in the competition law and policy objectives of one or more jurisdictions, although this topic is discussed to a degree. The principal focus of the two notes is to provide an analysis and synthesis of the responses to two questionnaires that were sent in advance to GFC meeting participants in respect of the respective topics. In addition, the objectives note incorporates some of the additional information provided by participants in their separate written contributions prepared for circulation at the GFC meeting. The most important themes emerging from the questionnaires and written contributions on Objectives were i) among OECD countries, there appears to be a shift away from use of competition laws to promote what might be characterised as broad public interest objectives; ii) there does not appear to be a strong correlation between competition law and policy objectives (broadly defined) and the design of the competition agency; iii) greater independence also was the step/measure most frequently identified as being likely to lead to better promotion/attainment of the articulated objectives. Turning to the note on Optimal Design, the key themes emerging from the responses to the questionnaire were i) there is a broad variety of different models and approaches to the design of competition agencies within the overall apparatus of government (broadly defined); ii) despite the institutional variety, there is a core of common tasks assigned to most competition agencies. Specifically, these agencies normally investigate, take at least certain kinds of decisions on competition cases and engage in competition advocacy; iii) around half the respondents reported having medium influence on their governments, legislative bodies, and other bodies of public administration through advocacy initiatives. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 7-45 Volume: 5 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K2134 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Review of Competition Law and Policy in Canada Abstract: Important issues in competition policy in Canada today are the independence and powers of the institutions and the balance between competition policy principles and national interests. The foundations of policy are being tested in merger litigation over the meaning of efficiency. Enforcement against cartels is complicated by a need to show that restraints are “undue.” Canada's “conformity continuum” offers an important, distinctive contribution to enforcement practice. Responses to controversies sometimes appear ad hoc, but the outcomes, such as the laws about banking mergers and about airlines, have recognised competition concerns. Policy options for consideration include finding other means to promote the goals now served by ownership controls, reviewing the scope of federal and provincial regulatory constraints on competition, clarifying the scope of the Commissioner's decision-making independence, and making enforcement more efficient by providing for private action, improving the decision process, and clarifying the anti-cartel principle. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 47-107 Volume: 5 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K2121 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Price Transparency: Will a Greater Degree of Price Transparency Help or Harm Buyers? Abstract: Although enhanced price transparency will generally increase competition to the benefit of consumers, this paper argues that it can have the opposite effect in some special situations. A negative impact is especially likely in markets already prone to anti-competitive coordination. In such markets, competition authorities should be suspicious of competitors exchanging price data, or engaging in any other practice that could help focus anti-competitive arrangements or help competitors more than customers to react to price changes. They should also be wary of exchanges of non-binding future prices. The paper identifies a number of key factors to consider in assessing whether increased price transparency might raise the probability of anticompetitive co-ordination. That includes having a look at meeting competition and most favored nation clauses, and the practice of base point pricing. The paper also examines price transparency as regards information exchanges within trade associations, price advertisements, and mandatory price transparency in public procurement markets. It closes with a short list of questions competition authorities might wish to keep in mind when investigating the effects of price transparency. This OECD Competition Roundtable was held in June 2001. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 109-181 Volume: 5 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2K210N Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Lennart Goranson Author-Name: Janos Volkai Title: Competition Law and Policy in South East Europe Abstract: Competition policy is a strong building block foundation of market economies. Development of competition policies in South East Europe (“SEE”) aims at creating a level playing field for investment, which is of major importance for the economic progress of the countries in the region. In 2001, a comprehensive programme for building capacities of SEE competition authorities was launched as a contribution to stability, sustainable growth and welfare in the region. Funded by the South East Europe Compact for Reform, Investment, Integrity and Growth, it was organised by the OECD Competition Division in partnership with the competition authorities of Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia. The long-term objectives of the programme were to strengthen national competition authorities of the region as law enforcers and advocates for economic reform based on competition principles. A major objective was also to support the establishment of intra-regional co-operation in the competition policy area. This concluding report draws on the experiences and the documentation produced by the representatives of SEE competition authorities, and provides an overview of the competition regimes in the SEE countries. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 7-82 Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JJ336 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Review of Competition Law and Policy in Poland Abstract: Poland’s 1990 competition law, which supported its transition restructuring, now substantively follows the rules of the EU treaty. But enforcement still focuses on abuses by successors to pre-reform monopolies. Competition enforcement agency by the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (OCCP) is combined with consumer protection and monitoring state aids, while Antimonopoly Court integrates regulatory policies by deciding cases about infrastructure regulation. Clarifying the OCCP’s independence from the government will support the integrity of law enforcement as well as a more publicly visible advocacy role. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 83-132 Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JJ323 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates Abstract: As with other policies offering lower prices to at least some buyers, loyalty and fidelity discounts are generally pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers even though they may harm certain competitors. Potential problems exist, however, when such discounts are employed in ways that reduce price transparency, exclude or restrict a significant number of actual or potential competitors, or raise the probability of anticompetitive co-ordination. The sometimes complex pro- and anti-competitive effects of loyalty and fidelity discounts are explored in the executive summary, background paper and summary of discussion pertaining to a June 2002 OECD Competition Committee roundtable discussion of the topic. While these documents reveal some interesting policy differences among various members of the Competition Committee, they also point to general agreement that loyalty and fidelity discounts are more likely to raise competition concerns when practised by firms enjoying substantial market power. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2003 Pages: 133-203 Volume: 5 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JJ30Q Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Issues for Trade and Competition in the Global Context Abstract: The complex relationship between trade policy and competition policy has been under study in the OECD for many years. In response to the Doha Declaration by WTO Ministers (November 2001), the OECD intensified its efforts, focussing on the topics suggested in Paragraphs 23-25 of the Declaration, i) core principles of non-discrimination, transparency and procedural fairness; ii) effective action against hard core cartels; iii) special and differential treatment/flexibility and progressivity; iv) voluntary co-operation in competition law; v) peer review and other possible compliance mechanisms: vi) capacity building and progressive reinforcement of competition institutions. This paper presents a synthesis of the work that has been done on each of these topics by the OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition and the Competition Committee. It was discussed on the occasion of the Joint Global Forum on Trade and Competition in May 2003, which brought together participants from over 70 economies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations to dialogue and moved forward the debate. The proceedings of the Forum have been published... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 7-55 Volume: 5 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JFXMP Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Review of Competition Law and Policy in the United Kingdom Abstract: The unusually complex competition policy institutions of the UK include a Commission that is concerned about the “public interest” in monopolies and market practices, the Director General of Fair Trading who enforces a competition law that is now modelled on European law, and many regulators who are also responsible for enforcing the same competition law in their sectors. Stronger powers under the Competition Act 1998 make enforcement more credible now, but still more changes are likely, notably concerning mergers and monopolies... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 57-140 Volume: 5 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JFXLW Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and Regulation Issues in Telecommunications: Synthesis Abstract: The telecommunications industry has been transformed by increasingly vigorous competitive activity in an environment of rapid technical and regulatory change. As new technologies grow and as competitors enter and expand, firms often seek access to the networks of their competitors. The rules for connecting networks can be critical for the success of new and established networks and can have significant effects on investment. In fact, the most complex questions facing regulators in a potentially competitive telecommunications market are frequently focused on the conditions of access of one network to another’s network. One reason these problems are severe is that, as long as subscribers are only connected to one network, that network has a monopoly over calls that terminate with its subscribers, even if different networks might have competed to obtain that subscriber... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 141-223 Volume: 5 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JFXKJ Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Competition Law and Policy in South Africa Abstract: One of the elements of South Africa’s peaceful revolution over the last decade was reform of its competition policy institutions. The previous system had supported the previous economic system, characterised by autarky, protection, government direction, and high concentration. The new system promised to use competition policy to correct the faults of the old system and to promote policy goals of employment and empowerment. South Africa aspires to a modern competition policy regime, to deal with the well-resourced sophistication of much of the South African economy. Its new institutions, whose novelty responds in large part to the post-1994 imperative for fundamental restructuring of government institutions, have shown a capacity to deal confidently with complex structural issues in deciding dozens of merger cases. A legalistic business and government culture has challenged these new bodies to prove their competence and tested their jurisdiction. Now that the merger review process has been established, more attention should be paid to non-merger matters and probably to advocacy as well. Resources are stretched, and there is a critical need to improve the depth and strengthen the capacity of the professional staff. Maintaining consistent competition policy in regulated sectors will requiring reinforcing the relationships with sectoral regulators ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 7-69 Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JCXKF Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Media Mergers: Synthesis by the Secretariat Abstract: Reviewing media mergers may be more complicated than reviewing other mergers because of the huge variety of possible media content and the two-sided market aspect of many media, i.e. those earning advertising revenue. A wide variety of content means that market definition is rendered more complex. The twosided market characteristic has important and sometimes far from obvious impacts on how mergers affect economic efficiency, media plurality and content diversity... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 73-78 Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JCXHK Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Gary Hewitt Title: Media Mergers: Background Note Abstract: The question of who owns our newspapers, television and radio is vital to democracy. The information and opinion we draw on must reflect a range of different voices and views if we are to be able to understand and debate the issues of the day. The Government’s task is to create a framework for media ownership which protects that plurality of voices and encourages a diversity of content whilst, at the same time, promoting the most competitive market for media businesses and attracting new investment ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 79-146 Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JCXG6 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Media Mergers: Summary of the Discussion Abstract: The Chairman made three general opening points: market definition is an important issue in most jurisdictions, and seems to be fairly similar across countries; behavioural remedies are heavily used and are highly case specific; and competition authorities are wrestling with the relationship between competition and pluralism issues but generally try to avoid it. Some competition authorities believe that promoting competition in itself promotes pluralism so nothing else is needed from competition authorities. Some contributions note, however, that competition authorities are criticised for ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 147-170 Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JCXF4 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and Regulation Issues in Telecommunications: Country Contributions Abstract: This section lists the 17 country contributions to the discussion of media mergers. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 171-171 Volume: 5 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMQCR2JCXD1 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Terry Winslow Title: Preventing Market Abuses and Promoting Economic Efficiency, Growth and Opportunity Abstract: Effective competition law and policy are critical to achieving greater levels of economic efficiency, growth, employment and living standards. Pro-competitive reform and sound competition law enforcement have delivered dramatic price reductions, a proliferation of new products, superior quality and service and enhanced innovation wherever they have been embraced. Perhaps more importantly, they have strong links with key pillars of economic growth and development such as investment, governance, the cultivation of an entrepreneurial class, privatisation and trade. Achieving a better appreciation and understanding of these benefits and links is essential to making continued progress in removing ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 7-108 Volume: 6 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMNKSNHKZQ8 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition Policy in Subsidies and State Aid Abstract: Many sectors of OECD economies are strongly influenced by government policies, which provide financial support, assistance or aid to individual firms in an industry. Subsidies like regulations maybe either beneficial or harmful, either promoting welfare or distorting competition, depending on the circumstances. A roundtable discussion held in the Competition Committee in February 2001 focused on subsidies which arise whenever an enterprise or a consumer receives a benefit whose cost is wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, paid by the state. The roundtable discussed notably the different forms of control, and how they distinguish legitimate from illegitimate subsidies; it explored as well the nature of these controls, and in particular to what extent they are part of a broader system of ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 109-173 Volume: 6 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMNKSNF9DR7 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: David Parker Title: Review of Sectoral Reforms in the United Kingdom: Energy and the Professions Abstract: This report analyses the institutional set up and use of policy instruments to regulate the gas and electricity sectors and the liberal professions in the United Kingdom. In the energy sector, the pace and scope of reform have been, and is prospectively, very rapid. However, there are still some tensions between the energy regulator and the competition authority, and some specific energy regulatory issues arise from the extension of market frameworks into areas previously controlled by traditional natural monopoly regulation. Also the interface of energy market regulation and social and environmental issues appears partly blurred. The report focuses as well on Professions, a significant component of the services sector, which is thriving in the UK. It discusses the process and outcomes from the recent extension of the UK competition law to cover professions, which ... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2004 Pages: 175-290 Volume: 6 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LMNKSNCSJF3 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Sarah Reynolds Author-Workplace-Name: OECD Title: Competition Law and Policy in Russia Abstract: The Russian Federation is the first non-member economy to participate in the OECD Regulatory Reform Programme. This review aims to assist the Russian authorities’ efforts to foster competition, innovation, and economic growth as well as to meet important social objectives. It follows a multidisciplinary approach, with competition policy as one of the several areas under review. This Secretariat report served as a basis for a peer review in the Global Forum on Competition in Paris on 13 February 2004. It concludes that although a strong... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 7-83 Volume: 6 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGXVRR6WKXN Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Substantive Criteria Used for the Assessment of Mergers Abstract: To decide if a merger should be blocked, conditioned or approved, three basic types of substantive test are employed: i) a dominance test (will the merger create or strengthen a dominant position?); ii) an SLC test (will the merger produce a substantial lessening of competition?); or iii) a public interest test (will the merger have a negative effect on the public interest?), This third test is not a... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 89-183 Volume: 6 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGXVRR3Q6MT Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John Clark Title: Competition Advocacy: Challenges for Developing Countries Abstract: Competition advocacy is especially critical for developing countries as their economic policies are undergoing fundamental market driven changes. Prerequisites for effective competition advocacy by a competition agency include a significant degree of independence from political influence, sufficient resource to support both its enforcement and advocacy functions, and credibility as an effective and impartial advocate for competition. Opportunities for competition advocacy are numerous: privatization; legislation, government policy and regulatory reform. The Second Latin American Competition Forum, jointly sponsored by the OECD and the Interamerican Development Bank (Washington 14-15 June 2004) discussed the... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 69-80 Volume: 6 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGMKD5ZNVHK Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition Issues in the Electricity Sector Abstract: Electricity markets are prone to the exercise of market power due to a combination of factors including: inelastic demand, lack of extensive practical storage of electricity, transmission congestion, transmission loop flows and capacity constraints coupled with diversity in the marginal costs of different types of generators. The level of market power can vary rapidly in time according to changes in transmission congestion and fluctuating load levels. Given the propensity of the electricity market to market power, horizontal structural separation (or divestiture) of the generation market is a key policy tool. Some structural separation has been carried out, but on a relatively limited scale. But congestion segments electricity markets and contributes to the exercise of generator market power. This effect can provide the incentive for building new generation capacity. So a balance must be found between providing an... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 81-181 Volume: 6 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGMKD5V8MZT Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Competition Law and Policy in Finland Abstract: Competition policy was at the centre of market-driven reforms since the late 1980s that restructured Finland’s network monopolies and eliminated the many vestiges of corporatist control. The pace of change is slower now, as the role of market institutions in providing traditional government services presents novel and difficult issues about quality, equity, efficiency, and choice. The role of the competition body, the Finnish Competition Authority (FCA), is also changing. In the previous stages, its principal path of influence, after it made a mark with a strong early enforcement program against tolerated price fixing, was through advice and advocacy. As competitive markets are... Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 7-67 Volume: 6 Issue: 4 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGMKD61ZFLW Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Competition Law and Policy in France Abstract: Competition law in France applies EU norms about restrictive agreements and abuses. The two institutions that apply the law must deal with its conflicting purposes concerning unfair competition, and with subtleties of policy choice and jurisdiction concerning the reform of infrastructure monopolies. The Director General of the DGCCRF and the chair of the Conseil de la Concurrence from France made some remarks on the Secretariat report. These introductory remarks to the peer review of France by the Competition Committee in October 2003 are in annex to this report. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2006 Pages: 7-81 Volume: 7 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L9VCJPHKX33 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Non-Commercial Services Obligations and Liberalisation Abstract: Universal service obligations are common in many of the infrastructure sectors. The obligations are often cited as a justification for limiting entry of new providers because the new providers would cherry-pick the highprofit customers who provide the basis for subsidization of another group of customers. When obligations are beneficial, there are a number of policy traps that can be encountered: Obligations are often poorly defined and not well-focused on the customers who are meant to receive help; Obligations are frequently defined narrowly in ways that disfavour new technologies and cause extensive waste; and financing for the noncommercial obligations can often be raised in more efficient ways than through cross-subsidies and can often be spent on multiple service providers rather than one preferred provider. Falling into these traps can create incentives for over-investment in certain infrastructure technology and under-investment in other technology. This paper provides guidance on the competition problems that can arise from universal service obligations and on some ways to limit these problems. This OECD Competition Committee roundtable was held in October 2003. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2006 Pages: 83-169 Volume: 7 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L9VCJPF4HVJ Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Competition Law and Policy in Germany Abstract: Germany's post-war competition law has been notably successful, and the enforcement body, the Bundeskartellamt, is widely respected. German institutions are now challenged to adapt to the modernised EU enforcement approach. Germany's institutional structure has supported competition well within its defined sphere; however, it may not be as well adapted to promoting competition in liberalising network sectors Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 7-66 Volume: 7 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGJHGV2HJ5K Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Merger Remedies Abstract: The following principles should guide competition authorities when devising remedies in merger cases: i) remedies are to be considered only if a threat to competition has been identified; ii) remedies should be the least restrictive means to effectively eliminate competition concerns; iii) remedies should address only competition concerns, and should not be used for industrial planning or other non-competition purposes; and iv) flexibility and creativity are key in devising remedies. Competition authorities in general strongly prefer structural remedies in the form of divestitures even though they might consider behavioural remedies, alone or in conjunction with divestiture remedies, appropriate in certain cases to address competitive concerns raised by a merger. Where several competition authorities consider remedies in the same transaction, coordination and cooperation among them is important to ensure consistency between remedial solutions. Despite differences in substantive tests and procedures, such cooperation and coordination with respect to remedies has been successful in an increasing number of transnational mergers. This Competition Committee roundtable was held in October 2003. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2005 Pages: 67-131 Volume: 7 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5LGJHGV0XWBR Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Report on Structural Separation Abstract: The Structural Separation Report was prepared by the OECD Competition Committee to review the implementation of the 2001 OECD Council Recommendation concerning structural separation in regulated industries. The report shows that many countries have implemented legislation that seeks to promote non-discriminatory access to noncompetitive infrastructure. In a number of jurisdictions, there is dissatisfaction with the access provided by integrated companies to their non competitive infrastructure, leading a number of jurisdictions to strengthen the barriers that separate noncompetitive and competitive parts of a company. One new approach seeks to create managerial incentives that are equivalent to those that would be faced by managers in fully structurally separated companies while maintaining unified ownership of noncompetitive and competitive lines of business. This approach can be termed functional separation and has recently been pursued in the telecommunications sector in at least two jurisdictions. The results of implementing functional separation will be of considerable importance for future policy decisions related to structural separation. The OECD Council endorsed the report’s conclusion relating to maintaining the Recommendation in its current form and invited the Competition Committee to report back in three years’ time on the implementation of the Recommendation. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2006 Pages: 7-65 Volume: 8 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L9HVJGN1CR4 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Structural Reform in the Rail Industry Abstract: In a competition roundtable focused on separation of rail track ownership from that of train operations, accumulating evidence is examined that suggests the value of structural separation in the railways sector may be less than previously thought. Integration may yield benefits for a number of reasons, including externalities between train operations and rail maintenance, and difficulties in overseeing traffic in an environment with delays and imperfect information for the train dispatcher. The potential value of separation may differ between passenger operations and freight operations. While passenger operations often require subsidies and, in a separated regime, are often provided via competition for the market (concessions), freight operations offer more potential for beneficial vertical separation. For international traffic between moderate-sized countries, the ability to operate across borders may be limited by a number of factors, including language and technical specifications which need to be addressed in order to broaden the potential for international rail-based freight. This Roundtable on Structural Reform in the Rail Industry was held in 2005 in the Working Party on Regulation of the Competition Committee. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2006 Pages: 67-175 Volume: 8 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L9HVJDW4KR0 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jay C. Shaffer Title: Competition Law and Policy in Turkey Abstract: This report served as the basis of a peer review of the Turkish Competition Authority (TCA) held in the 2005 OECD Global Forum on Competition. It concluded that the TCA has achieved significant progress since its establishment in 1997. While noting the particular strengths of the TCA, the report makes a wide range of recommendations to address the full array of still persisting competition law and policy issues in Turkey. These recommendations are expected to improve the effectiveness of the implementation of competition law and policy in Turkey. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2006 Pages: 177-251 Volume: 8 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L9HVJDTX6R0 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Jay C. Shaffer Title: Competition Law and Policy in Mexico, 2004 Abstract: This report on Mexico’s competition law and policy, which was the foundation for a peer review examination in early 2004, is a follow-up to a 1998 OECD assessment. Mexico’s competition commission (“CFC”) has become a mature and well-respected agency; however, the degree of general support for competition policy in Mexico remains an open question. The CFC has encountered problems in the courts, and its resources have declined despite an increasing workload. The 2004 report and peer review recommended a number of changes in operations and law to make enforcement and advocacy more effective. In 2006, Mexico revised its basic competition law to incorporate many of these recommendations, such as strengthening investigative powers for onsite inspections, increasing sanctions (including the possibility of orders to divest assets in case of serious, repeat violations) and providing for Senate approval of appointments to the CFC. In response to court rulings that some applications of the previous law were unconstitutional, the revised law now specifies when practices such as predatory pricing, exclusive dealing, cross subsidization and price discrimination would be violations. The merger notification system has been simplified. The amendments have also strengthened the CFC’s roles and powers of advocacy and policy advice in dealing with legislation, regulatory proceedings and other levels of government. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 7-68 Volume: 8 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4TPN5KPWR1 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Enhancing Beneficial Competition in the Health Professions Abstract: Health professions are overseen by an array of rules and regulations that are justified by the need to protect consumers from unqualified practitioners. The most common method of ensuring practitioner quality is professional licensure. Because health care expertise is necessary to establish the appropriate program of study, training, and examination for new professionals, a licensed profession often directly or indirectly controls its own licensure rules. In this process of selfregulation, a profession exercises its legitimate interest in maintaining the quality of its members. But a self-regulating profession also has the potential to abuse its control over who can practice and how they practice in order to enhance member income. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 69-151 Volume: 8 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4TPN5GS9MS Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition in the Provision of Hospital Services Abstract: Because of the high percentage of national income and government budget typically associated with the provision of hospital services and because there is substantial evidence of hospital services could often be delivered more efficiently than they are, a number of OECD countries have increased the extent to which competitive mechanisms are adopted to increase the efficiency of hospital care delivery. Hospital services are complex set of products and services than comprise many different types of patient-oriented activities and not all services are equally subject to competition. For some services, such as emergency services, a hospital may have few if any competitors. For other services, such as inpatient scheduled surgeries, a hospital may compete for patients with other hospitals that offer comparable care. For still other services, such as diagnostic services, specialist consultations and outpatient services hospitals may at times compete with diagnostic centers, doctors’ offices and ambulatory surgery centers. Competition between providers of hospital services can have a number of impacts, including reducing excessive hospital stays, reducing costs of providing care and improving quality of care. Mechanisms for increasing competition or market forces identified in this paper include: collecting and distributing improved information on provider performance; supporting new entry when entry and exit costs are low; encouraging independent or private operation of facilities; improving allocation of human resources, particularly through reducing anticompetitive restrictions by professionals; introducing prospective pricing in combination with benchmarking; physician-led purchasing; providing for greater consumer choice, particularly when waiting lists are long; introducing contestable management of hospitals; and applying competition law in circumstances where public policy focuses on pro-competitive mechanisms. A competitive mechanism that might work in one system will not necessarily transfer well to another. Moreover, competitive mechanisms may at times increase costs. As health policy makers increase reliance on competitive mechanisms, they may need to think carefully about structural market conditions and potentially involve competition authorities when it appears that participants in the market are acting to restrain or eliminate competition. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 153-247 Volume: 8 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4TPN57W7MV Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Michael Wise Title: Competition Law and Policy in the European Union Abstract: Competition policy played a central role in the development of the EU and its institutions. The European Commission, supported by the European courts, developed the framework for competition policy in Europe. This framework has been built since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 on a foundation of promoting market opening while strengthening the institutions of the European Community. The competition policy of the European Community is now in transition toward a basis in market-centered economic considerations, as well as on application through the now-extensive network of nationallevel authorities. The “modernisation” reforms of the enforcement process became effective in May 2004, along with changes in the control of mergers, and the Commission has been considering revisions to its policies about other topics, notably abuse of dominance and state aid. As the Member States adapt their substantive rules to those of the Community, the roles of the European Commission, the national competition agencies and the courts are changing. Co-ordination of enforcement among many agencies in the European Community, particularly concerning applications for leniency as part of cartel investigations, is increasingly important. The Commission moved to strengthen its capacity for economic analysis and to correct weaknesses in its decision process that had been revealed in critical court decisions. The challenge to this system, well adapted for administrative application, is to produce results that are convincing to the courts while maintaining policy consistency in a system of decentralised enforcement. This report served as the basis for a peer review in the Competition Committee in 2005. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 7-80 Volume: 9 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4FK7VVVXG6 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Predatory Foreclosure Abstract: Dominant firms can use various strategies to eliminate or deter competition, including unlawful price cuts or “predatory pricing”. That strategy involves a willingness to absorb losses in the near term that are rational only because they lead to greater profit in the longer term, after competitors have been disciplined or eliminated. Despite differences in statutes across jurisdictions, the roundtable discussion held in October 2004 in the Competition Committee quickly revealed a virtually unanimous view that the purpose of competition laws is to protect and promote competition, not competitors. With respect to methods for detecting predatory prices, including price-cost tests, there was a greater diversity of views because different cost measures are appropriate in different situations. There was broad agreement among Members that investigations should include an examination of whether an alleged predator would likely be able to recoup its predatory losses, with a negative finding indicative of a low probability of harm to competition. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 81-167 Volume: 9 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4FK7VSTGVL Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Resale below Cost Laws and Regulations Abstract: Despite general agreement that consumers benefit from lower prices that are not predatory, several nations have laws against loss leader sales even when they are unlikely to foreclose competition. These laws appear to protect competitors rather than competition. The Competition Committee’s roundtable discussion in October 2005 focused on efforts to reform or remove laws against loss leader sales and efforts to prevent such restrictions from being enacted. The Secretariat background note argued that rules again loss leader sales should be sunsetted because they are likely to harm consumers and protect inefficient competitors, fail to account adequately for pro-competitive business justifications for loss leader sales and detract from economic dynamism and growth. Japan, Germany and France, defended their rules against price competition, although France was in the process of a reform. Members of a second group of countries were working to remove laws against loss leader sales. The nations in a third group with no law against loss leader sales, reported efforts by groups of competitors to have such rules applied either at the national level or at the state/provincial level. Both the consumer and business submissions argued that prohibiting loss leader sales is likely to harm consumers and protect competitors, rather than competition. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 169-255 Volume: 9 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4FK7VRBSR0 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: Philippe Gugler Title: Competition Law and Policy in Switzerland Abstract: Swiss competition policy has traditionally been relatively lenient and low profile. The impact of competition policy on economic development has therefore been at best neutral. As the slow rate of growth becomes an issue, however, a more vigorous approach to competition has been identified as an important factor for improving growth prospects. The 2003 reform of the Cartel Act strengthened Swiss competition law, in particular by introducing direct sanctions for the most serious infringements and a leniency programme, thus bringing it closer to that of the European Union and of many other OECD countries. The Swiss Competition Commission has been given considerable new powers to combat private restraints of competition. Comco will have to enforce the new laws resolutely and step up action to promote regulatory reforms. In doing so, it is burdened by institutional arrangements and mechanisms that temper its full independence. The Swiss competition enforcers do not benefit from the networks of exchanges available to national competition authorities in EU member States. Matters are further complicated by a relative lack of resources. Strengthening competition is key for an effective internal market. The amendments to strengthen the Cartel Law and pending reform proposals signal determination on the part of the Confederation to tackle the problems. This report served as the basis for a peer review in the Competition Committee in 2005. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 7-92 Volume: 9 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4BC6Q29WQ7 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and Regulation in Agriculture Abstract: The Competition Committee (WP2 on Competition and Regulation) hold a roundtable discussion in June 2004 on Competition and Regulation in Agriculture: Monopsony Buying and Joint Selling. Monopsonistic purchasing practices and joint price-setting activities in the agro-food sector were examined, with a particular focus on regulation and on the potential improvements that could arise from more pro-competitive regulations. Joint activity by producers can have a number of beneficial effects, such as from promoting a brand or food that would not otherwise be promoted, promoting a style of production (like organic production) or purchasing in large quantity in order to obtain quantity discounts. Harms may arise when the joint activity involves price or qualitysetting and there is little competition from close substitutes. Cartellike activity by producers has often been supported by governments but is unlikely to achieve stated public policy goals because it often leads to higher consumer prices but enhance land values more than farmer income. Potentially monopsonistic purchasing practices in the agricultural sector were also considered. At times, price manipulation by large purchasers may occur. Competition authorities play an important role in assuring that activities of purchasers do not involve market power, particularly when purchases are concentrated in few, large firms and sellers have limited options besides selling into a highly concentrated market. However, to the extent that purchasers wish to contract for very specific forms of production, such as specific varieties of grain, there can be good commercial reasons that a purchaser would wish to focus on a specific forms of production and agriculture products should not be considered different from supplies in other sectors, which are customized for different purchasers. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 93-165 Volume: 9 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4BC6PXT56B Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Environmental Regulation and Competition Abstract: Environmental protection and competitive markets are two of the highest policy priorities. In June 2006 the Competition Committee held a roundtable discussion on potential restrictions to competition due to environmental protection. Environmental regulations can constitute substantial barriers to entry in some markets, can provide a basis for predatory behaviour in some markets and can be harmful to competition and welfare through a variety of other channels. Environmental rules can thus raise prices to consumers by reducing competition in the market. Any assessment of the costs and benefits of an existing or proposed environmental rule is incomplete without an analysis of the costs generated by any resulting reduction in competition. On the other hand, there is no firm empirical evidence that environmental policy affects the competitiveness of firms and countries. Ideally, environmental policies should be effective and among equally effective policies, the policy that is least restrictive of competition should be chosen. Environmental policy makers should ensure that environmental benefits continue to outweigh costs, including the indirect costs associated with effects on market structure. Environmental policy is first and foremost about securing public environmental goods which are demanded in their own right and which are fundamental to a well-functioning market. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2007 Pages: 167-239 Volume: 9 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5L4BC6PWB5D8 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Cartels: Sanctions against Individuals Abstract: Corporate sanctions rarely are sufficiently high to be an optimal deterrent against cartels. Sanctions against natural persons can thus complement them. There is no systematic evidence proving the deterrent effects of sanctions on individuals, and/or assessing whether such sanctions can be justified. There is a trend among countries to accept as self-evident that individual sanctions, including imprisonment, can be a useful part of effective anti-cartel enforcement. If a country provides for individual sanctions, a strong argument can be made that relatively short prison sentences are the most cost effective deterrent. However, there are also reasons why countries may provide for longer prison sentences, most importantly that only longer statutory sentences adequately express a society’s condemnation of hard-core cartels. In addition to increasing levels of deterrence, sanctions against individuals can be a powerful incentive for individuals to reveal information about existing cartels and to cooperate in investigations. International law does not recognise the principle of double jeopardy that would prevent authorities in different countries from prosecuting the same person for participation in the same cartel. Nevertheless, where cartels are investigated in a multi-jurisdictional context, jurisdictions may consider arrangements to ensure that only one of them prosecutes an individual. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2009 Pages: 7-47 Volume: 9 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KSNSW7Z817D Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement Abstract: Circumstantial evidence is employed in cartel cases in all countries. The better practice is to use circumstantial evidence holistically, giving it cumulative effect, rather than on an item-by-item basis. Complicating the use of circumstantial evidence are provisions in national competition laws that variously define the nature of agreements that are subject to the law. There are two general types of circumstantial evidence: communication evidence and economic evidence. Of the two, communication evidence is considered to be the more important. Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous. It could be consistent with either agreement or independent action. Therefore it requires careful analysis. National treatment of cartels, such as whether they are prosecuted as crimes or as administrative violations, can affect the burden of proof that applies to the cases, and hence the use of circumstantial evidence. It can be difficult to convince courts to accept circumstantial evidence in cartel cases, especially where the potential liability for having violated the anti-cartel provisions of the competition law is high. There are circumstances in countries that are relatively new to anti-cartel enforcement that could affect the extent to which they rely on circumstantial evidence in their cases. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2009 Pages: 49-105 Volume: 9 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KSNSW7VQDNN Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Monitoring Review of Korea Abstract: This report reviews the achievements of the Korean 3-Year Market Reform Road Map. This assessment is carried out in light of the OECD’s previous recommendations to shift KFTC priorities and resources toward core competition problems related to efficiency goals and away from its historic focus on conglomerate financial structure and governance; the need for further improvements in investigative powers and a clearer rule against hard-core cartels; implementation of recommendations to repeal exemptions for “small” business and exclusions of professional services and co-ordination with sectoral regulators about competition problems; and recent institutional changes to join the KFTC with the system for applying consumer protection law. This report was the basis for a monitoring review in the October 2006 session of the Competition Committee. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2009 Pages: 107-137 Volume: 9 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KSNSW7S2RZP Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: John Clark Title: Country Review: El Salvador Abstract: The OECD has been active in promoting competition policy among countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and formed a partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank to further this aim. The principal feature of this partnership has been the annual Latin American Competition Forum (LACF), at which senior officials from countries in the region discuss, in roundtable fashion, issues of competition policy of interest to them. Each of the first four Forums featured a peer review of one country in the region. At the fifth Forum held in 2007, work focused on the four Latin American peer review reports which had been produced in the framework of the Latin American Competition Forum (Brazil, Chile, Peru and Argentina) as well as the peer review of Mexico held in the OECD Competition Committee. This work assessed the impact that the peer reviews have had on competition policy and on the competition agencies in the countries concerned. “Peer review” is a core element of OECD work. The mechanisms of peer review vary, but it is founded upon the willingness of a country to submit its laws and policies to substantive questioning by other members of the international community. This process provides valuable insights to the reviewed country and promotes transparency and mutual understanding for the benefit of all.There is an emerging consensus on best practices in competition law enforcement and in applying competition policy principles to regulatory systems. Countries now co-operate regularly in such areas as anticartel enforcement and international mergers. Peer reviews are an important part of this process. The OECD and the IDB are pleased to have participated in this partnership for the promotion of competition policy in Latin America and the Caribbean. This work is consistent with the policies and goals of both organisations. Sound competition policy will promote economic growth and prosperity, bringing benefits to consumers in the region and substantially improving the business climate. Both organisations would like to thank the Government of El Salvador for volunteering to be peer reviewed at the sixth LACF meeting, held in Panama, on 10-11 September 2008. Finally, we want to thank Mr. John Clark, the author of the report, and the many competition officials whose written and oral contributions to the Forum have been so important to its success. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 173-203 Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMHBHP8690V Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Construction Industry Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated issues related to the Construction Industry in June 2008. This roundtable addressed the special characteristics of the construction industry as they relate to competition law and policy. Construction is a critical sector in OECD economies because it builds and maintains the structures and infrastructure on which almost every other industry depends. Unfortunately, the construction industry has also tended to suffer from cartel activity, as shown by a spate of well - publicised recent matters from around the world. The roundtable includes an examination of why this industry seems to be more prone to cartel formation than other industries. It also looked into the complications that may arise when multiple construction firms use the same bid calculation software. Finally, the Committee discussed the arguments – occasionally made by industry advocates – that competition is either irrelevant or “ruinous” in the construction industry. Neither argument was found to be persuasive, as there are no distinguishing features of the construction sector that reduce the benefits that competition brings to consumer welfare. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 153-171 Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMHBHP87TBV Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition in Bidding Markets Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated competition in bidding markets in October 2006. Competition authorities become interested in auctions by a number of routes. In competition advocacy, they may advise other parts of government on how to design auctions in order to improve their efficiency—the degree of competition. They may evaluate mergers and agreements between firms that operate in auction markets. And they may be concerned with collusion and abuse of a dominant position in auctions. Because their formal rules reduce “noise” and make communication among rivals easier, auctions can promote collusion, compared with ordinary “posted-price” markets. But an auction can be designed to reduce collusion or concerted practices or to promote participation. Thus, the design of an auction can be the object of lobbying pressure. Auctioneers can also behave strategically, choosing auction formats or practices that favour competition. Two fundamental prescriptions for effective auction design follow from the theoretical literature: Induce bidders to truthfully reveal their valuations by making what they pay not depend entirely on what they bid, and maximize the information available to each participant before he bids. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 69-151 Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMHBHP8SGS6 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Concessions Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated concessions in February 2006. Governments have long been engaged in providing goods or services to their citizens that could, in some form, be provided by the private sector. The trend over the past few decades, however, has been to transfer these functions, and the state-owned assets used to provide them, to private hands. The most common method, and the one usually preferred, is privatisation, or outright sale or transfer of ownership of the relevant assets to one or more private parties. Another method is concessions. Concessions are often viewed as a substitute for privatisation when the latter is not feasible for political or legal reasons. Concessions are not substitutes for regulation. Where there is a need for regulation, as in a situation of natural monopoly, a regulatory regime may be created along with the concession. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 7-67 Volume: 10 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMHBHP8V9MW Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Country Review: Chinese Taipei Abstract: This report, prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD was the basis for a peer review examination of Chinese Taipei at the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition on 9 February, 2006. Competition law in Chinese Taipei has been an important element of the program of economic reforms that moved the economy from centrally directed emphasis on manufacturing and exports to a market-driven emphasis on services and high technology. The competition law follows mainstream practice about restrictive agreements, monopolies and anticompetitive mergers, with a particularly clear statutory basis for concentrating enforcement attention on horizontal collusion. The rules about market deception and unfair practices connect the competition law to consumer interests. There is a risk, though, that rules based on a cultural tradition of fairness might lead to interventions to correct differences in bargaining power, which could dampen competition rather than promote it. The competition enforcement agency, the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), is now a stable, experienced administrative agency. It followed an appropriate sequence in introducing competition policy, emphasising transparency and guidance to encourage compliance before undertaking stronger enforcement measures. General reforms are in process that would clarify the independence of the FTC. To improve enforcement against hard-core cartels, a leniency programme should be adopted, and the special treatment for agreements among small businesses should be limited. Some other aspects of the enforcement tool-kit should be revised, such as the cap on fines and the use of market share as a merger notification test. The most visible regulatory reforms to promote competition have been in telecoms, although an independent regulator for that sector is just now being set up. The government retains holdings in privatised firms that could have implications for market competition, so FTC vigilance about the risk of cross-subsidy or other distortion remains warranted. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 127-165 Volume: 10 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMJLGT6J0WJ Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Improving Competition in Real Estate Transactions Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated improving competition in real estate transactions in February 2007. Real estate transactions are subject to a variety of potential limitation of competition that can have significant effects on ordinary consumers. In fact, because of the annual volume of transactions and the fact that real estate expenses (mortgage payments and rent) constitute a significant portion of spending out of available revenue to spend (often exceeding 25%), the impacts of anti-competitive action i this sector may have larger financial value than in most other sectors. Practices of real estate agents vary significantly across countries, but a common trend appears to be the introduction of listing services that may provide a platform for anti-competitive practices to spread, at the same time as the Internet potentially provides improved opportunities for real estate sellers to reach buyers directly. In many countries, the operation of transferring legal title to properties is subject to cartel-like prices. Competitive problems have also been identified in the mortgage markets, with cartel activity having been found in a least one case and a lack of non-bank sources of finance in some countries. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 75-125 Volume: 10 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMJLGT6KWNN Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Land Use Restrictions as Barriers to Entry Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated competitive effects of land use restrictions in February 2008. Land use restrictions often serve valuable social purposes. The benefits of particular policies for land use must be balanced against the costs, though. The social harms that can arise when land use restrictions create “entry barriers” are rarely considered explicitly. Land use restrictions can raise the price and reduce supply of a broad range of real estate and, by preventing new and innovative stores from opening, reduce shopping options available to consumers. More careful integration of policy on land use restrictions with competition policy could benefit consumers and many entrepreneurs and reduce the likelihood that public or private restrictions will lead to supply scarcity. This roundtable examines competition problems affecting commercial construction and use permits, geographic density tests, adverse impact tests, access condition to rights of ay and private restrictions on land use. Steps are identified for improving public policies towards land use restrictions. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 7-73 Volume: 10 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMJLGT6NGQ4 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Country Review: Peru Abstract: The Competition Peer Review Report of Peru is the fourth one of a non-OECD country. South Africa and Russia were reviewed at meetings of the OECD Global Forum on Competition (GFC). Chile, and now Peru, were reviewed at meetings of the Latin American Competition Forum (LACF), organised by the OECD and the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB). All four reviews confirm that the peer review process is an extremely useful means of promoting co-operation and voluntary convergence among OECD and non-OECD economies, providing both transparency and a candid discussion of what constitutes “best practice” in different situations. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 177-230 Volume: 11 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMBPJ557SG2 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies Abstract: The Global Forum of the OECD Competition Committee debated the Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies in February 2008. The two policies share a common goal: the enhancement of consumer welfare. In this way they are highly complementary. Applied properly, they reinforce one another; Aside from their different approaches to markets, however, there are other differences between competition and consumer policies. These differences present both opportunities and challenges. Applied consistently, each policy ill each make the other more effective, especially in situations of evolving markets. The challenge comes in coordinating them, and in ensuring that they do not work at cross purposes. Institutional design is an important factor in providing effective public policy. With the increasing recognition of the importance of integrating competition policy and consumer policy, there is debate about how to design the most effective institutions for that purpose. Housing the two functions in a single agency offers several advantages, including more centralised control, operational efficiencies and cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines. There could be disadvantages as well, however. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 133-176 Volume: 11 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMBPJ559N6G Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition Policy for Vertical Relations in Gasoline Retailing Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated competition issues in vertical relations for gasoline retailing in October 2008. Gasoline retailing has changed dramatically over the last 25 years. While refiners often still have extensive networks of gasoline retailers, there is also a large independent sector in many countries; A study of the effects of entry by large general retailers finds benefits to consumers; There has been a vigorous debate about whether vertical separation between gasoline stations and upstream entities should be required. It appears that mandating vertical separation is linked with price increases to the ultimate consumers. On the other hand, mandated separation may promote the development of more independent stations. Policy makers often raise concerns about vertical integration in the supply of gasoline. These concerns should be moderated in markets with large independent segments. Even in markets with small independent segments, there are reasons to believe prices will be lower with vertical integration, as this eliminates a double mark-up. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 91-131 Volume: 11 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMBPJ55C8MX Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Energy Security and Competition Policy Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated energy security and competition policy in February 2007. This roundtable examined the links between competition policy and energy security, with a focus on natural gas. The discussion began by addressing the questions of the meaning and importance of energy security; and the determinants of energy security, particularly as they relate to competition policy. It continued in dealing with gas supply, transportation, and distribution, addressing five aspects that relate to different aspects of energy security: (1) the role of substitutes for natural gas in fostering competitive gas supply; the role of regulation in promoting or inhibiting infrastructure investment; (2) how to promote an adequate level of infrastructure investment; (3) the role of unbundling in fostering competition and promoting energy security; (4) the role of storage capacity in system efficiency and buyer bargaining position; (5) and the determinants of entry into merchant sales of natural gas. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2010 Pages: 7-90 Volume: 11 Issue: 1 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KMBPJ55F9JG Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Country review: Ukraine Abstract: This report* was the basis of a two hour and a half peer review in the OECD Global Forum on Competition (GFC) on 21 February 2008. It assesses the development and application of competition law and policy in Ukraine, focusing on activities over the previous five years (2003-07). The report concludes that Ukraine has a comprehensive and well-designed competition law and, in the AMC, an effectively managed and well-regarded agency to enforce it. The report also identifies an array of problems confronting Ukraine in the competition law arena, and makes various remedial proposals, including recommendations dealing with the AMC’s budget allocation, autonomy, investigative tools, transparency, enforcement priorities, and relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Additional recommendations in the report focus on the competition law’s merger notification requirements and procedures, state aid legislation, penalties for unlawful conduct and penalty collection procedures, competition advocacy, harmonization with the European Union’s competition laws, and the elimination of conflicting provisions in Ukraine’s Commercial Code. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 153-222 Volume: 11 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9QGF28VG8 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Plea bargaining: settlement of cartel cases Abstract: Plea agreements or negotiated settlements can be an efficient way to formally dispose of  cartel cases.They can provide substantial benefits to competition authorities by allowing them to allocate their resources more efficiently and to increase enforcement activities, thus  achieving greater deterrence. Plea agreements have substantial benefits for defendants as well. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 107-151 Volume: 11 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9QGF2CP9S Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Private remedies Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated private remedies in June 2006. The roundtable focused on class actions/collective actions and the interface between private enforcement and public enforcement: • Class Actions/Collective Actions: There is a strong case for the use fo class actions/collective actions to raise levels of deterrence and achieve greater compliance with competition laws, as theses actions may be the only practical way to ensure that customers with small claims also have their day in court. • Interface between Public and Private Enforcement: There is a widely shared concern that private litigation in competition cases can interfere with leniency programs in cartel cases. There is a trade-off between enabling the victims of a cartel to recover damages and incentives for cartel members to come forward, and no-one really knows with certainty how much protection from private litigation and damage awards is necessary so as not to deter leniency applicants. The prevailing view is that the integrity of leniency programs should be protected by a range of measures that limit a leniency applicant’s exposure to civil damages, but some delegates felt that the current trend provided unnecessary protection to leniency applicants to the detriment of private plaintiffs. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 7-105 Volume: 11 Issue: 2 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9QGF34Z5L Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Country review of Argentina Abstract: The Inter-American Development Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development co-operate in competition law and policy to promote increased economic growth, employment and economic efficiency and a higher average standard of living in the medium to long term. There is increasing consensus that sound competition law and policy are essential to achieving these goals. “Peer review” is a core element of OECD work. The mechanisms of peer review vary, but it is founded upon the willingness of all OECD countries and their partners to submit their laws and policies to substantive questioning by other members. This process provides valuable insights to the reviewed country and promotes transparency and mutual understanding for the benefit of all. The benefits of this process are particularly clear in the area of competition law and policy. As a result of the activities of the Competition Committee, OECD countries that once had real conflicts on competition issues have become partners in seeking to halt harmful international anticompetitive practices. The Committee has also become an important forum for assessing and demonstrating the usefulness of applying competition policy principles to economic and other regulatory systems. IDB/OECD co-operation in competition law and policy centers on annual meetings of the Latin American Competition Forum. LACF meetings include substantive roundtable discussions and peer reviews of national laws and institutions. The peer reviews have examined Brazil, Chile, Peru and now Argentina. The IDB is pleased to participate and finance this work, as part of its efforts to promote a better business climate for investment in the counties of Latin America and the Caribbean. We want to thank the Government of Argentina for volunteering to be peer reviewed at the fourth LACF meeting, held in San Salvador, El Salvador, on 11-12 July, 2006. It was encouraging to hear Argentina’s Delegation confirm at the meeting that the report’s recommendations were helpful and to hear from Delegates of other countries that this review has improved their understanding of Argentina’s competition law and policy. Finally, we want to thank Mr. John Clark, the author of the report, and the many competition officials whose written and oral contributions to the Forum have been so important to its success. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 167-205 Volume: 11 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9Q0ZJZ6LX Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and regulation in retail banking Abstract: The Competition Committee debated retail banking in October 2006. Competition can improve the functioning of the retail banking sector without harming prudential regulation. The efficient functioning of the sector is important for economic performance. The sector is considered special primarily because of externalities related to potential “contagion” effects stemming from (i) the withdrawal-upondemand characteristic of some bank deposits and (ii) the role banks play in the payment system, and (iii) the fact that banks are important for the funding of consumers and SMEs. Customer mobility and choice is essential to simulate retail-banking competition. An important observation is that the degree of customer mobility is low and the longevity of customer-bank relationships is long. Financial information sharing platforms should therefore be promoted and, where limited by privacy laws, privacy laws should be modified in a way that maintains the goal of protecting privacy while also allowing consumers to receive the benefits of credit ratings. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 101-165 Volume: 11 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9Q0ZK2WQ2 Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0 Author-Name: OECD Title: Competition and efficient usage of payment cards Abstract: The OECD Competition Committee debated competition and efficient usage of payment cards in June 2006. In recent years, debit and credit cards have become increasingly common as retail payment mechanisms and have increasingly displaced checks and cash. The roundtable discussed potential market power and pricesetting abuses related to payment cards, reviewed the regulatory (or self-regulatory) mechanisms that sometimes govern the operation of card networks and considered methods for increasing the role of competitive forces among payment cards. A market failure exists because costs for different payment mechanisms are rarely reflected in consumer prices. Consideration should be given to permitting merchants to form payment ventures, as this would promote system competition between owners with different incentives, and to promoting entry by potential new technologies that would not involve existing payment networks. Many other policy options are discussed. Journal: OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy Year: 2011 Pages: 7-99 Volume: 11 Issue: 3 Handle: RePEc:oec:dafkaa:5KG9Q0ZK74VB